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I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the best way to understand early-Twenty-First Century state
and federal cannabis law in the United States is to examine the relevant history.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s statement is apropos: “[A] page of history
is worth a volume of logic.”1 This article begins by discussing the early history
of cannabis and its uses. Next, this article examines the first state and federal
marijuana laws. After a brief comparison of alcohol prohibition to cannabis
prohibition, this article addresses cannabis laws from the 1920s to the early
1950s. Then, this article takes up the reorganization of the federal drug
regulatory bureaucracy since its inception. Addressing the current era of
cannabis laws and regulations, this article recounts how marijuana became a
Schedule I drug. The discussion then turns to changing social attitudes towards
cannabis as reflected in presidential politics and popular culture. Starting with
the late-1990s, this article describes the development of state and federal
cannabis laws and policies up to the present day.
By definition, the term “present day” temporally fixes this article to late
2020. This is problematic because cannabis laws constantly change. It is
entirely possible that this article will be rendered obsolete in the near future.
For example, currently-pending, federal legislation could fundamentally change
cannabis law and policy.2 Indeed, on November 20, 2019, the U.S. House of
Representatives Judiciary Committee passed the Marijuana Opportunity
Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019 (MORE Act).3 This legislation
would, inter alia, remove cannabis from the federal Controlled Substances Act
and allow the individual States to regulate the cannabis industry within their
respective borders.4 Thus, this article shall avoid attempting to predict the
future. In any event, per Justice Holmes, the past is always relevant to the
future.
This article is based upon a February 2019 presentation delivered to The
Center for Health Law and Policy at Cleveland State University, ClevelandMarshall College of Law. The author is grateful to the law school for the
opportunity to present this article.

1

New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).

2

See, e.g., Secure and Fair Enforcement Banking Act of 2019, H.R. 1595, 116th Cong. (2019);
Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States Act, S. 3032, 116th Cong. (2019);
Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act, H.R. 420, 116th Cong. (2019).
3

See Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act, H.R. 3848, 116th Cong.
(2019).
4

See generally id.
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II.

EARLY HISTORY OF CANNABIS

Cannabis has historically been known by several names, such as
“hemp,” “Indian hemp,” “marywana,” “maraguana,” and “marihuana.”5 Official
Jamaican government documents use the term “ganja.”6 “Marihuana,” with an
“H,” is the traditional spelling in the United States, particularly in official,
government documents.7 “Marijuana,” with a “J,” is the popular, contemporary
spelling.8 The preferred term among pro-cannabis advocates is “cannabis”
because the term “marihuana” is associated with early-Twentieth Century, anticannabis propaganda to brand the drug as a foreign, and therefore dangerous,
substance.9 “Cannabis” is the Latin form of the Greek word “κάνναβις.”
Researchers from the University of Vermont have recently concluded
that cannabis originated in the Tibetan Plateau twenty-eight million years ago.10
Hemp cultivation began in Western China in antiquity, and then spread to
Central Asia, India, Asia Minor, and Africa.11 Historically, hemp has had three
primary uses: (i) Fiber for rope, twine, cloth, and textiles,(ii) seeds for oil and
birdseed, and (iii) resin for medicine, religious rituals, and as an intoxicant.12
Hemp was used medicinally in Ayurvedic medicine in India as early as the Fourth
Century B.C.E.13 By the Fourteenth Century, hemp cultivation began in
Europe.14

5

See RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION:A
HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES XIX (1974).
6

See, e.g., Jamaican Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 2015, §3(a) (defining “ganja”).

7

See, e.g., Ohio R.C. §2925.01(D)(1) (using the term “marihuana”); Michigan statutes
§§333.26421-26430 (“Michigan Medical Marihuana Act”); 21 U.S.C. §812, Schedule I(c)(10)
(using the term “marihuana”).
8

See, e.g., Ohio R.C. Chapter 3796 (“Ohio Medical Marijuana Control Program”). See also
Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 211, p. 58523, fn. 2 (“Although the statutory spelling is
“marihuana” in the Controlled Substances Act, this rule [(i.e., 7 C.F.R. Part 990)] uses the more
commonly used spelling of marijuana.”).
9

But see Robert A. Mikos & Cindy D. Kam, Has the “M” word been framed? Marijuana,
cannabis, and public opinion, Plos One (Oct. 31, 2019)
(https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0224289) (last visited Sept. 25,
2020) (“Throughout each of our tests, we find no evidence to suggest that the public distinguishes
between the terms “marijuana” and “cannabis.” We conclude with implications of our findings for
debates over marijuana/cannabis policy and for framing in policy discourse more generally.”)
(emphasis in original).
10

See Origins of cannabis traced back 28 million years to the Tibetan Plateau
https://www.earth.com/news/origins- cannabis-tibetan-plateau/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2020).
11

See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 1-2.

12

See id. at 1.

13

See Ethan Russo, M.D., Historical Review of Cannabis for Pain Relief and Addiction
Treatment, p. 4 (2018).
14

See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 2.
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Carl Linnaeus first classified the genus Cannabis in 1753.15 Within the
Cannabis genus are the species C. sativa and C. indica. Some taxonomists
recognize a third species: C. ruderalis. However, others classify C. ruderalis as
a sub-species of C. sativa.16 Hemp is a variant of C. sativa. Sub-varieties of
cannabis are traditionally known as “strains.” However, the term “cultivar” is
enjoying increasing currency in the cannabis industry.
The Spanish introduced hemp to the Western Hemisphere in modernday Chile in 1545.17 In the modern-day United States, hemp cultivation began
in (i) 1611 in Jamestown, Virginia, (ii) 1632 in Massachusetts, (iii) 1775 in
Kentucky, and (iv) 1835 in Missouri.18 By the 1850s, hemp was grown in
California, Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa, and Nebraska.19 Hemp processing
occurred throughout the Great Lakes region.20In the mid-1800s, cotton replaced
hemp as a textile source. This caused hemp production to decline. However,
hemp continued to grow wildly throughout the United States.21
In 1839, Irish physician William B. O’Shaughnessy, M.D., published a
paper entitled On the Preparations of the Indian Hemp, or Gunjah (Cannabis
Indica).22 Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s paper discussed, inter alia, the use of cannabis to
successfully treat rheumatic disorders.23 In 1848, Scottish physician Robert A.
Christison authored A dispensatory of commentary on the pharmacopoeias of
Great Britain and the United States, which stated, in part:
Indian hemp has been used as antispasmodic in hydrophobia,
tetanus, malignant cholera, and infantile convulsions, with
marked relief in repeated instances. Some cases of tetanus
appear to have been cured in the East-Indies by it;—It has been
employed with success as an anodyne in chronic rheumatism,
15

See id. at 1.

16

See 84 Fed. Reg. 58,531 (Oct. 31, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt 990) (“Cannabis is a
genus of flowering plants in the family Cannabaceae of which Cannabis sativa is a species, and
Cannabis indica and Cannabis ruderalis are subspecies thereof.”).
17

See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 2-3.

18

See id.

19

See id.

20

See id.

21

See id. at 58,540 (“The production of hemp has a long history in the United States Prior to the
mid-20th Century, hemp had been cultivated in the U.S. for hundreds of years to make flags, sails,
rope, and paper. The first regulation of hemp occurred in 1937 with the Marihuana Tax Act, which
required all producers of the species Cannabis sativa to register with and apply for a license from
the Federal Government. The “Hemp for Victory” Campaign during World War II promoted the
production of hemp for rope to be used by U.S. military forces, but at the end of the war, the
requirements in the Marihuana Tax Act resumed. In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled
Substances Act, granting the Attorney General the authority to regulate production of hemp.”)
(capitalization in original).
22

See RUSSO, supra note 13, at 21.

23

See id.
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toothache, and other varieties of neuralgia. I have used it a good
deal and with great success, in diseases at large, to obtain sleep.24
Military physicians used cannabis as an analgesic in the treatment of
combat injuries during the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865).25 Finally, in 1891,
American physician J.B. Mattison published an important paper in the St. Louis
Medical and Surgical Journal.26 Dr. Mattison noted the effectiveness of
cannabis in treating cocaine and opiate addiction.27 Moreover, he reported
success in treating migraine headaches with cannabis:
In headache, periodical or long continued, one half to two grains
solid extract may be given each hour or two till the attack is
arrested, and then continued in a similar dose, morning and
night, for weeks or months. It is important not to quit the drug
during a respite from pain. Recollect that hemp eases pain
without disturbing stomach and secretions so often as opium, and
that competent men think it not only calmative, but curative.28
Thus, the Nineteenth Century saw the beginnings of serious scientific study of
the medicinal benefits of cannabis.
By the late-Nineteenth to early-Twentieth Centuries, cannabis use in the
United States was largely confined to medicinal applications. Moreover, there
was not a significant degree of recreational cannabis use in the United States
during this period. Instead, Americans at this time recreationally used alcohol,
tobacco, opium, morphine, and cocaine.29 In Mexico, on the other hand,
smoking cannabis as an intoxicant was common from the 1880s onward. For
example, Francisco “Pancho” Villa’s soldiers were known to smoke cannabis.30
Recreational cannabis consumption also occurred in the Caribbean. The
practice of smoking cannabis as an intoxicant was imported from Mexico to the
United States along the Rio Grande River in the early-1900s.31 Caribbean
merchants and sailors also introduced cannabis into cities along the Gulf of
24

Id. at 24.

25

See id. at 25 (quoting 4 The Medical and Surgical History of the Civil War (1992)).

26

See id. at 33.

27

See id. (“In these, often, [cannabis] has proved an efficient substitute for the poppy.”).

28

Id. at 34 (quoting Cannabis indica as an anodyne and hypnotic, 61 St. Louis Med. Surg. J. 26571 (1891)). In addition to the aforementioned Nineteenth Century medical cannabis researchers,
there were Edward A. Birch, John Clendinning, M.D., Thomas D. Crothers, M.D., Michael
Donovan, William R. Gowers, Richard Greene, M.D., Hobart Hare, M.D., Silas Weir Mitchell,
John Russell Reynolds, and Édouard Séguin. Working primarily in England, France, India,
Ireland, and the United States, these individuals pioneered the study of medicinal cannabis. See id.
at 22-35.
29

See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 9.

30

See id. at 4-5.

31

See id. See also id. at 32-34.
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Mexico such as New Orleans, Houston, and Galveston.32
III.

THE FIRST STATE AND FEDERAL MARIJUANA LAWS
A. Early Federal Legislation

The federal government began legislatively controlling drugs in 1906
when Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act. This act was “the first major
federal drug legislation to require labeling of all preparations containing more
than prescribed amounts of opiates . . .”33 Three years later, federal legislators
passed the “Act to Prohibit Importation and Use of Opium,” which “barred the
importation of opium at other than specified ports and for other than medicinal
use.”34 These federal laws were the first steps in what would ultimately become
federal cannabis prohibition.
B. 1914 El Paso, Texas City Ordinance Banning Sale and Possession of
Marijuana
Given that recreational cannabis was introduced into the United States
primarily along the United States-Mexico border, it is not a mere coincidence
that perhaps the first, express cannabis prohibition law arose in a border city on
the Rio Grande River: El Paso, Texas. In 1914, El Paso enacted a city ordinance
which banned the sale and possession of cannabis.35 The rationale for this
ordinance was the belief that cannabis use caused violent behavior among
Mexicans, “Negroes, prostitutes, pimps, and a criminal class of whites.”36 This
rationale—the Criminality Theory—was representative of the prevailing view
among policymakers of the time. Here, one can clearly see the racism and class
bias that would inform cannabis law and policy ever since.
C. Harrison Narcotics Tax Act
In 1914, Congress passed the Opium and Coca Leaves Trade
Restrictions Act. This law is better known as the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act,
named after its sponsor Representative Francis B. Harrison (D-NY). This law
“required registration and payment of an occupational tax by all persons who
32

See id. at 42.

33

Id. at 15.

34

Id.

35

See id. at 34.

36

Report of Investigation in the State of Texas, Particularly along the Mexican Border, of the Traffic
in, and Consumption of the Drug Generally known as “Indian Hemp,” or Cannabis Indica, known
in Mexico and States Bordering on the Rio Grande as “Marihuana’; Sometimes also referred to as
“Rosa Maria,” or “Juanita.” Federal Bureau of Narcotics files (Apr. 13, 1917), p.
13.http://antiquecannabisbook.com/TexasReport1917/TexasReport1917.htm (last visited Sept. 25,
2020).
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imported, produced, dealt in, sold, or gave away opium and coca leaves and
their derivatives.”37As American government was understood in 1914, only
States could regulate the practice of medicine, and the federal government
could not do so unless the activity involved interstate commerce.38 But, the
federal government expressly has the constitutional power to tax.39 So, the courts
upheld the Harrison Act on revenue raising grounds. Eventually, the Harrison
Act effectively became a prohibition law.40 Between 1914 and 1931, the
individual States responded to the Harrison Act by passing their own laws
criminalizing possession of cocaine, opiates, and drug paraphernalia.41 These
State laws were known as “Little Harrison Acts.”
D. Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act and the Federal Narcotics Control
Board
Congress passed the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act in 1922. This
law (i) established the Federal Narcotics Control Board,42 and (ii) made drug
possession a federal crime.43 At this time, policymakers did not use the term
“narcotic” according to its scientific definition. Instead, “narcotic” was
understood to mean any drug used by individuals of low socio-economic
standing:
The most important feature of this initial prohibitory phase is
that marihuana was inevitably viewed as a “narcotic” drug,
thereby invoking the broad consensus underlying the nation’s
recently enunciated antinarcotics policy. This classification
emerged primarily from the drug’s alien character. Although use
of some drugs— alcohol and tobacco—was indigenous to
American life, the use of “narcotics” for pleasure was not.
Evidently, drugs associated with ethnic minorities and with
otherwise “immoral” populations were automatically viewed as
“narcotics.”44
Thus, cannabis was classified as a narcotic. And, because narcotics were
outlawed, cannabis was outlawed.

37

BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 16.

38

See id. at 61.

39

See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.

40

See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 19-20.

41

See id. at 38-39, 52.

42

See part VIII, infra (discussing the Federal Narcotics Control Board).

43

See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 20.

44

Id. at 51.
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IV.

ALCOHOL PROHIBITION & MARIJUANA PROHIBITION

Narcotics prohibition and the broader War on Drugs are often compared
to alcohol prohibition. The Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
(1917) provides: “The manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating
liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the
United States and all the territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage
purposes is hereby prohibited.” The Volstead Act, enacted in 1919,
implemented the Eighteenth Amendment.
Alcohol prohibition was animated by concerns over excessive
consumption, political corruption, and the “evils” of saloons as dens of vice and
anti-social activity.45 For example, some men would get drunk after work and
then go home and physically abuse their wives and children. Conscientious
prohibitionists sought to remedy this horrible situation. Prohibitionists were
also motivated by nativism, however. Italian immigrants drank wine. German
immigrants drank beer. Irish immigrants drank whiskey. Moreover, saloons
served as community centers and places of political organization for these
immigrant communities. By criminalizing alcohol, nativist prohibitionists could
strike a blow against these immigrants’ cultures and fledgling political power.
Narcotic prohibition was animated by concerns over “immorality” and
disfavored groups like immigrants and ethnic minorities.46 Therefore, some
historians have argued that alcohol prohibition and narcotic prohibition
merely coincided in time and that they were caused by separate and distinct
social forces.47 More recent historiography holds that alcohol prohibition and
narcotics prohibition are closely related phenomena. For example, historian
Lisa McGirr argues that alcohol prohibition laid the foundation for the War on
Drugs and the dramatic increase in federal incarceration of drug offenders.48 In
any event, beginning in the late-Twentieth Century, cannabis legalization
advocates pointed to the history and unintended consequences of alcohol
prohibition as an argument against cannabis prohibition.49
V. 1920S TO 1940S
A. Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act and Anslinger’s Army
On June 14, 1930, Congress abolished the Federal Narcotics Control
Board and replaced it with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN). The FBN

45

See id. at 21-27.

46

See id. at 27.

47

See id. at 26-27.

48

See generally LISA MCGIRR, THE WAR
AMERICAN STATE (2016).
49

ON

ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION

See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 21-22, 26-27, 28-31.
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AND THE

RISE

OF THE

was within the Treasury Department.50 Approximately one month later,
President Hoover and Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon appointed Harry J.
Anslinger commissioner of the FBN. Anslinger served as FBN commissioner
until 1962.51 Anslinger is a hero or a villain depending on which side of the
cannabis issue one supports. Anslinger’s views on cannabis are summed up in
his 1937 statement: “If the hideous monster Frankenstein came face to face
with the monster Marihuana, he would drop dead of fright.”52
During the 1920s and 1930s, rising crime and anti-Mexican bias lead to
calls for cannabis prohibition.53Anslinger and the FBN enthusiastically
answered that call. However, at this time in American history, federal
government power was more circumscribed than it is in the modern era. As the
U.S. Constitution was then-understood, the federal government had very
limited regulatory power because most such powers were still wielded by the
individual States. This was before the New Deal and its expansion of federal
authority. So, rather than seek a federal strategy, Anslinger pursued a national
regulatory regime through uniform State laws. Under Anslinger’s influence, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the
Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act on September 15, 1932. Importantly, this act
classified cannabis as a narcotic.54
Once the Uniform Act was published, Anslinger and the FBN
vigorously lobbied State legislatures to adopt it.55 However, by March 1935,
only ten States had done so.56 So, the FBN began a propaganda campaign
against the “Marihuana Menace.” Anslinger marshalled the Hearst newspaper
chain, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the World Narcotic Defense
Association, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, the Young Women’s
Christian Association, the National Parent-Teacher Association, and the
National Councils of Catholic Men and Women in this lobbying effort.57
Collectively, these groups were known as Anslinger’s Army. The infamous 1936
film Reefer Madness (also known as Tell Your Children and Doped Youth
depending on where and when the film was shown) was part of Anslinger’s
propaganda effort. Within one year of the start of Anslinger’s crusade, twentyeight States had adopted the Uniform Act.58 Notably, during this time, the
American pharmaceutical industry resisted cannabis prohibition on the grounds
50

See id. at 65-66.

51

See id. at 66.

52

See id. at 117.

53

See id. at 69-75, 83.

54

See id. at 90.

55

See id. at 94-95.

56

See id. at 95.

57

See id. at 95-111.

58

See id. at 115.
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that cannabis had legitimate, medicinal benefits.59
It has been suggested that Anslinger’s antipathy to cannabis was due to
his family’s financial interests. Mellon appointed Anslinger to be the first
commissioner of the FBN. Anslinger was married to Mellon’s niece. Mellon
had a financial interest in a whiskey distillery. Therefore, the theory goes,
Anslinger attacked cannabis in order to help Mellon’s whiskey business. This
theory enjoys some popularity among Anslinger’s critics. However, there is
little direct historical evidence to support it.
B. Sonzinsky and the Marihuana Tax Act
As described above, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act (1914) was upheld as
a revenue raising law pursuant to Congress’s tax power. By the late-1930s,
however, the law operated more as a drug prohibition statute and less as a
revenue raising law.60This presented a potential problem for narcotics
prohibitionists: May a de jure tax operate as a de facto prohibition? This issue
was resolved in Sonzinsky v. United States.61
In response to the gun violence associated with alcohol prohibition,
Congress passed the National Firearms Act in 1934. This law required gun
sellers to pay a $200 tax for every gun that they sold. Sonzinsky was convicted
of violating this act and he appealed. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the
United States upheld the law as a “prohibitive tax.” That is, a tax primarily
designed to prohibit conduct and not to raise revenue.
Now that Sonzinsky had endorsed the legality of prohibitive taxes,
Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 which placed a tax on the sale
of cannabis.62 Anslinger aggressively lobbied Congress in favor of the
Marihuana Tax Act.63 Just as the pharmaceutical industry opposed the Uniform
State Narcotic Drug Act, the American Medical Association objected to the
Marihuana Tax Act on the grounds that it would stop research on medical
cannabis.64 Ultimately, the New Deal Congress was predisposed to robust
federal action to prohibitively tax cannabis. As a result of the Marihuana Tax
Act, research on medicinal cannabis became virtually nonexistent, possession
and transfer of cannabis was a federal crime, and most cannabis in the United
States grew wildly.65 The Marihuana Tax Act remained in effect until 1969
when it was declared unconstitutional on Fifth Amendment grounds (self-

59

See id. at 118.

60

See id. at 124-26.

61

300 U.S. 506 (1937).

62

See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 126.

63

See id. at 154.

64

See id. at 164-65.

65

See generally id. at 175-86.
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incrimination) in Leary v. United States.66
C. LaGuardia Report
An important dissent to Anslinger’s public policy efforts was The
Marihuana Problem in the City of New York (1944) (i.e., the LaGuardia
Report).67 Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia commissioned this report and the New
York Academy of Medicine prepared it.68The LaGuardia Report was a
comprehensive study of the cannabis phenomenon. The report contained a
sociological study, an examination of the mental attitudes of cannabis users
toward society, a report on cannabis use among school children, a clinical
study, a study of the “Marihuana Cigarette,” discussions of psychotic episodes,
organic and systemic functions, psychophysical functions, and intellectual
functioning, and a comparison between users and non-users regarding mental
and physical deterioration.69 The LaGuardia Report contained several
conclusions. Among these conclusions are:
7. The practice of smoking marihuana does not lead to addiction
in the medical sense of the word. . . .
9. The use of marihuana does not lead to morphine or heroin or
cocaine addiction and no effort is made to create a market for
these narcotics by stimulating the practice of marihuana
smoking.
10. Marihuana is not the determining factor in the commission of major
crimes. . . .
12. Juvenile delinquency is not associated with the practice of smoking
marihuana.
13. The publicity concerning the catastrophic effects of
marihuana smoking in New York City is unfounded.70
Thus, the LaGuardia Report rejected the Criminality Theory; the
underlying theory of cannabis prohibition during the 1930s and 1940s.
Moreover, the report presciently rejected the Gateway Drug Theory of cannabis
prohibition.

66

395 U.S. 6 (1969).

67

LaGuardia Report at 1, http://rodneybarnett.net/PDF/Laguardia%20Report%201944.pdf
(last visited Sept. 25, 2020).
68

See id. at 1-4.

69

See generally id.

70

Id. at 22.
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VI.

1950S: THE GATEWAY DRUG THEORY AND THE BOGGS ACT

In the post-World War II period, cannabis’s alleged link to addiction,
insanity, and crime (the Criminality Theory) had fallen out of favor. The
Criminality Theory had been the traditional rationale for cannabis prohibition.71
In its place, cannabis prohibitionists began to rely upon (and continue to rely
upon) the Gateway Drug Theory. That is, cannabis is allegedly a gateway to
other drugs like cocaine, heroin, and morphine.72
Based upon the Gateway Drug Theory, Congress passed the Boggs Act in
1951.73 This law was named for Representative Thomas Hale Boggs, Sr. (DLA), who sponsored the legislation. The Boggs Act provided uniform penalties
for violations of the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act and the Marihuana
Tax Act. These penalties were draconian. For example, a first offense was
punishable by two to five years in prison. A second offense was punishable by
five to ten years imprisonment and a $2,000 fine. A third offense would result
in ten to twenty years in prison and a $2,000 fine. Moreover, for second and
subsequent offenses, there was no parole, probation, or suspended sentences.74
As with the campaign in support of the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act
of the 1930s, Anslinger and his allies (Anslinger’s Army) enthusiastically
supported the Boggs Act.75 Many of the same groups from before joined this
lobbying effort, including the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the
General Federation of Women’s Clubs, and the National Congress of Parents
and Teachers.76 The Boggs Act and its legislative history (including floor
statements and committee testimony and exhibits) enshrined the Gateway Drug
Theory of cannabis into public policy.77 By the 1950s, the societal consensus
was that cannabis was a gateway drug. Therefore, the reasoning went, harsh
criminal penalties were seen as the answer to end cannabis use and
trafficking.78
From 1951 to 1955, the federal Boggs Act inspired “Little Boggs Acts”
among thirty-four States.79 The Ohio statute (1955) was particularly harsh,
71

See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 204.

72

See id.

73

See id. at 204.

74

See id. at 210.

75

See id. at 209.

76

See id.

77

See id. at 214-15.

78

See id. at 206-08.

79

See id. at 215, fn. 46. These States are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See id. at 218.
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imposing a twenty to forty-year sentence for selling narcotics.80 Under the
Louisiana statute (1956), prison sentences ranged from five to ninety-nine
years.81
As an aside, 1950s America was marked by widespread fear of
Communism and the Cold War. Some associated drug trafficking with
Communism. For example, in 1951 the Chief of the Los Angeles Police
Department claimed that Communists agents were importing cannabis and
other drugs in an attempt to corrupt American youth.82
VII.

1960S TO EARLY-1970S

By the end of the 1950s, American mainstream society reached a
consensus regarding cannabis: (i) cannabis was a “narcotic,” and (ii) cannabis use
was restricted to people in the lowest socio-economic levels.83 This consensus
began to unravel in the 1960s. In 1963, psychologist Timothy Leary began
experimenting with LSD at Harvard. At the same time, the Psychedelic
Movement began in San Francisco.84 These events influenced people throughout
the country, particularly young adults. The great social movements of the 1960s
created “[a] general loosening of restraints imposed by the legal system on
behavior with ‘moral’ overtones.”85 These movements included the Civil Rights
Movement, Free Speech Movement, Anti-Vietnam War Movement, and
Environmentalism.86 Cannabis became a symbol of this counterculture.87
By the late-1960s, cannabis use became associated with college students.
These college students came from the middle and upper classes and had access
to politicians and public opinion-makers.88 During this time, cannabis use
became more widespread beyond the counterculture. Some American
universities reported that up to seventy percent of their students used cannabis.
Moreover, cannabis use became increasingly common among young
professionals, blue-collar workers, and Vietnam War veterans. One watershed
event in this changing perception of cannabis users was the 1970 arrest of
Robert F. Kennedy Jr., and his cousin Sargent Shriver, III, for marijuana
possession.89 Kennedy is, of course, the son of Senator Robert F. Kennedy
and the nephew of both President John F. Kennedy and Senator Edward
80

See id. at 215.

81

See id.
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See id. at 209.
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See id. at 222.

84

See id. at 224.

85

Id.
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See id.
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See id. at 227.
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See id. at 223.

89

See id. at 238.
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Kennedy. Shriver is a member of the Kennedy family and the son of the
then-U.S. Ambassador to France. Once children of privilege began publicly
using cannabis, the old stereotypes of the typical cannabis user were no longer
valid. Consequently, cannabis use became less identified with any particular
race, class, or age. And, cannabis was no longer associated entirely with radical
politics and the hippie lifestyle.90
By the early 1970s, the draconian criminal penalties of the federal Boggs
Act and the Little Boggs Acts became viewed as unjustly harsh. Police officers
began to ignore minor violations, such as possession of small quantities of
cannabis and personal use. Judges handed down less severe sentences for
marijuana crimes. Courts began diversion programs for first time drug
offenders.91 In 1970, thirty-two States reduced their criminal penalties for
cannabis possession.92
VIII.

REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT
BUREAUCRACY

As described above, federal bureaucratic regulation of cannabis began
with the Federal Narcotics Control Board (FNCB) in 1922. The FNCB was
within the Treasury Department.
In 1930, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) replaced the FNCB.
The FBN was also a part of the Treasury Department.
The Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) existed from 1966 to 1968
within the Food and Drug Administration.
In 1968, the FBN and BDAC were combined to form the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) within the Justice Department.93 The
BNDD’s enforcement policy focused on major drug trafficking and not on
possession.94
In 1973, the BNDD was combined with other federal offices to form the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). These other federal offices included
the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and Special Agents from the
Bureau of Customs. Consequently, the DEA had a more pronounced law
enforcement character than its predecessors. The DEA remained under the
Justice Department.95
The salient point here is that federal drug enforcement bureaucracy
began in the Treasury Department, briefly included the Food and Drug
Administration, and ended up in the Justice Department. This law enforcement
orientation toward cannabis policy has been a feature of American public policy
90

See id. at 237-38.
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See id. at 239-40.
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See id. at 279.
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See id. at 242.
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See id.
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See www.dea.gov (last visited Sept. 25, 2020).
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since the DEA was established.
IX.

HOW MARIJUANA BECAME A SCHEDULE I DRUG

For much of the Twentieth Century, American drug policy relied
significantly on the Marihuana Tax Act. The Supreme Court of the United
States ruled the Marihuana Tax Act unconstitutional in Leary v. United States.96
In 1970, Congress sought to (i) replace the Marihuana Tax Act, and (ii)
modernize American drug policy. Congress accomplished this in 1970 when it
passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act and the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA).97
The CSA created the five-tiered Schedule system. Schedule I
substances are defined as follows:
The findings required for each of the schedules are as follows:
(1) Schedule I.—
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States. [and]
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other
substance under medical supervision.”98
There was controversy over whether cannabis belonged in Schedule I
with conflicting testimony and evidence on both sides. The version of the CSA
that ultimately became law empowered the Attorney General to decide whether
to schedule new drugs and whether to re- schedule existing drugs, but with
binding input from the Secretary of the Health, Education, & Welfare
Department.99 Congress and the U.S. Attorney General provisionally
categorized cannabis as a Schedule I drug, but promised to revisit the issue
once the science was settled.100 In order to reach such a scientific consensus, the
96

395 U.S. 6 (1969).

97

See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 244 (The Controlled Substances Act is codified
at 21 U.S.C. §801 et seq.).
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21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)-(C).
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See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 246. See also 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)(1)-(2).
Currently, Congress may reclassify cannabis out of Schedule I via legislation. Congress may also
legislatively remove cannabis from the CSA schedule system entirely (i.e., deschedule). The U.S.
Attorney General may also reclassify cannabis within the CSA schedule system and also
deschedule cannabis. See id.
100

See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD II, supra note 5, at 246-47.
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CSA established a Presidential Commission on Marihuana and Drug
Abuse.101The Committee Report on the House Bill noted: “The Commission will
be of aid in determining the appropriate disposition of the [marihuana
scheduling] question in the future.”102
In 1970, then, Congress created the National Commission on Marihuana
and Drug Abuse. The Commission became popularly known as the “Shafer
Commission” because the chairman was then-Pennsylvania governor Raymond
Shafer. The Shafer Commission had thirteen members. The President appointed
nine members. Congress appointed the other four.103 Richard Nixon was the
president at this time. In that same year, President Nixon stated: “I am against
legalizing marihuana. Even if the Commission does recommend that it be
legalized, I will not follow that recommendation.”104 Because of President
Nixon’s public and well documented opposition to cannabis legalization, critics
expected the Shafer Commission to recommend against scheduling cannabis
out of Schedule I because the president appointed a supermajority of the
commission members.
On May 26, 1971, as the Shafer Commission was preparing its report,
President Nixon had a conversation in the Oval Office with White House Chief
of Staff H.R. “Bob” Haldeman. The president stated:
I want a Goddamn strong statement on marijuana. Can I get that
out of this sonofabitching . . . Domestic Council[sic]? . . . I mean
one on marijuana that just tears the ass out of them. . . .
You know it’s a funny thing, every one of the bastards that are
out for legalizing marijuana is Jewish. What the Christ is the
matter with the Jews, Bob, what is the matter with them? . . .
By God we are going to hit the marijuana thing, and I want to hit
it right square in the puss 105
In approximately the same time period, Haldeman wrote in his
diary: “[Nixon] emphasized that you have to face the fact that the whole
[drug] problem is really the blacks. The key is to devise a system that
recognizes this while not appearing to.”106
101

See id. at 247.
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Id. (quoting U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st
Cong., 2d sess. H. Rept. 91-1444, p. 13).
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See id. at 255.
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Id. at 256.
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May 13, 1971 Oval Office Conversation – meeting with Nixon, Haldeman
and Ehrlichman, http://www.csdp.org/research/nixonpot.txt (last visited
Sept. 25, 2020).
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Reflecting years later on the Nixon Administration’s cannabis policy,
Nixon White House Domestic Affairs Advisor John D. Ehrlichman said:
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after
that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people We
knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or
black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with
marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both
heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest
their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and
vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know
we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.107
On March 22, 1972, the Shafer Commission issued its report. Among the
report’s findings and conclusions, the Shafer Commission rejected both the
Criminality Theory and the Gateway Drug Theory and recommended
decriminalizing marijuana. A month earlier, the National Institute of Mental
Health issued a report that reached the same conclusions.108
Two days after the Shafer Commission report was issued, President
Nixon said: “I oppose the legalization of marihuana and that includes sale,
possession[,] and use. I do not believe you can have effective criminal justice
based on a philosophy that something is half-legal and half- illegal.”109 Law
enforcement officials also condemned the Shafer Commission’s report.110 In
October 1972, President Nixon declared “drug abuse” to be “America’s public
enemy number one.”111 Finally, on March 10, 1973, President Nixon stated:
In recent days, there have been proposals to legalize the possession
and use of marihuana. I oppose the legalization of the sale,
possession[,] or use of marihuana. The line against the use of
dangerous drugs is now drawn on this side of marihuana. If we move
the line to the other side and accept the use of this drug, how can
we draw the line against other illegal drugs? . . . There must
continue to be criminal sanctions against the possession, sale[,] or
use of marihuana.112
1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-05-17/news/mn-58835_1_haldeman-diary (last visited Oct.
6, 2020).
107
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Thus, the Nixon Administration rejected the Shafer Commission report and
caused cannabis to remain a Schedule I drug under the CSA. Cannabis has
remained a Schedule I drug ever since.
X.

CHANGING SOCIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS MARIJUANA
A. Presidential Politics

President Nixon resigned from office following the Watergate Scandal in
1974. From 1974 to present, subsequent presidential administrations have
continued the Nixon Administration’s cannabis policies. These administrations
are Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump; Five
Republicans and three Democrats. Notable during this period was First Lady
Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” anti-drug campaign which included, of course,
cannabis.
Nevertheless, social attitudes have significantly changed over the last
five decades. In March 1992, while campaigning for president, Bill Clinton
said: “When I was in England, I experimented with marijuana a time or two,
and didn’t like it. I didn’t inhale and I didn’t try it again.”113 Three years later,
Barack Obama wrote Dreams From My Father in advance of his campaign for
the Illinois Senate. He republished the book in 2004 after he became a national,
public figure. In this memoir, Obama admitted to cannabis and cocaine use.114
When he ran for president in 2007, the public was largely unconcerned with his
drug use history. So, in the span of twelve years, American society went from a
presidential candidate who dubiously denied cannabis use to a candidate who
openly admitted to it without any negative political consequences.
B. Popular Culture
Evolving social attitudes toward cannabis use are also reflected in popular
culture. In 1976, Jamaican Reggae musician Peter Tosh released an album
called “Legalize It.” Although this song was initially banned in Jamaica, it has
become a popular decriminalization anthem. From the mid- 1960s until the
1990s, the band Grateful Dead was strongly associated with marijuana. Their
concerts were de facto marijuana conventions.115 In the 1980s and 1990s, a
similar phenomenon occurred with the band Phish. Since the 1990s, hip hop
artist Snoop Dogg has openly used and advocated in support of cannabis.
113
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During the 1970s and 1980s, comedy duo Cheech and Chong had an act
which largely involved cannabis-based humor. Tommy Chong remains a
prominent cannabis reform advocate. The 1998 cult film The Big Lebowski
featured a protagonist who frequently smoked cannabis. The television series
That ‘70s Show ran from 1998 to 2006 on the Fox Broadcasting Network. This
show regularly featured cannabis themed jokes. The popular 2004 film Harold
& Kumar Go To White Castle is a comedy that tells the story of two young men
who smoke cannabis, become hungry, and embark on an odyssey to get fast
food. Finally, in 2005, the film Reefer Madness was remade as a musical
comedy.
These popular culture elements portrayed cannabis use in a positive,
often comical, light that reflected a broad social acceptance of cannabis use,
and the rejection of the traditional arguments against cannabis use, such as the
Criminality and Gateway Drug Theories.
XI.

STATE AND FEDERAL MARIJUANA LAWS FROM THE 1990S TO 2010S
A. State Legalization of Medical and Recreational Cannabis

Despite changing social attitudes in favor of cannabis decriminalization,
cannabis cultivation, manufacturing, possession, importation, exportation,
trafficking, and use remain criminal offenses. The federal statutes are codified
at 21 U.S.C. §§841-865 (Part D—Offenses and Penalties). These statutes are
the criminal enforcement portion of the Controlled Substances Act. Every State
has similar statutes criminalizing cannabis.116 Nevertheless, States began
legalizing cannabis for medicinal use beginning in 1996. Currently, thirty-six
jurisdictions have legalized medical cannabis:
1996
1998
1999
2000
2004
2006
2007
2008
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2016
2017
2018
116

California
Alaska, Oregon, Washington
Maine
Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada
Montana, Vermont
Rhode Island
New Mexico
Michigan
Arizona, District of Columbia, New Jersey
Delaware
Connecticut, Massachusetts
Illinois, New Hampshire
Maryland, Minnesota, New York
Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania
West Virginia
Missouri, Oklahoma, Utah

See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925 (West 2020).
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2020 Mississippi, South Dakota117
If one includes cannabidiol118 types of medical cannabis119, then the
following seventeen States may be added to the above list:
2014
2015
2017
2018

Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin
Georgia, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, Wyoming
Indiana, South Dakota
Kansas120

Going further, sixteen jurisdictions have currently legalized nonmedical, adult use, recreational cannabis:
2012
2014
2016
2018
2019
2020

Colorado, Washington
Alaska, District of Columbia, Oregon
California, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada
Michigan, Vermont
Illinois
Arizona, Montana, New Jersey, South Dakota121
B. Conant v. Walters

As noted above, California legalized medicinal cannabis in 1996. That
same year, the Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control
117

See Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG
https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/legal-medical-marijuana-states-and-dc/ (last
visited Nov. 11, 2020).
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Cannabidiol (“CBD”) is a type of cannabinoid in the cannabis plant that has shown promise in
treating several conditions, particularly epilepsy. It lacks the psychoactive effects of
Tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”). It is also known as “Charlotte’s Web Oil” or “CBD oil.”
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In 2018, Congress passed another Farm Bill which expanded the pilot program and legalized hemp
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84 Fed. Reg. 58,522-64; Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Public Law 115-334 (115th
Cong.) (Dec. 20, 2018). After 2018, then, a legal distinction exists between marijuana-derived
CBD (illegal) and hemp-derived CBD (legal). Because of this legal distinction and the
proliferation of lawful, hemp-derived CBD, the importance of CBD in medical cannabis policy is
greatly diminished.
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Policy (i.e., Drug Czar), the DEA, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)122 promulgated a
policy in response to California’s medical cannabis legalization:
The federal policy declared that a doctor’s “action of
recommending or prescribing Schedule I controlled substances is
not consistent with the ‘public interest’ (as that phrase is used in
the federal Controlled Substances Act)” and that such action
would lead to revocation of the physician’s registration to
prescribe controlled substances.123
Also pursuant to the policy, the DOJ and HHS sent letters “to practitioner
associations and [State medical] licensing boards informing those groups of the
policy.”124 This letter “cautioned physicians who ‘intentionally provide their
patients with oral or written statements in order to enable them to obtain
controlled substances in violation of federal law . . . risk revocation of their
DEA prescription authority.’”125
In order to lawfully prescribe medications, a physician must (i) be
licensed to practice medicine by the relevant State regulatory authority (i.e.,
State medical board), and (ii) have a Controlled Substance Registration
Certificate from the DEA.126 Without these two credentials, a physician may
not lawfully prescribe medications. It is virtually impossible to practice
medicine without the ability to prescribe. Thus, the federal policy threatened to
effectively prevent physicians who recommended medical cannabis from
practicing medicine. “By speaking candidly to their patients about the potential
benefits of medical marijuana, [physicians] risk losing their license to write
prescriptions, which would prevent them from functioning as doctors. In other
words, they may destroy their careers and lose their livelihoods.”127
In response, four patient and physician groups sued the Drug Czar,
DEA, DOJ, and HHS for injunctive relief in the U.S. District for the Northern
District of California. Specifically, and based upon the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment, the plaintiffs sought to permanently “enjoin enforcement
of the government policy insofar as it threatened to punish physicians for
communicating with their patients about the medical use of marijuana.”128 The
trial court certified a plaintiff class, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and
permanently enjoined the defendants from:
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See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 629 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 946 (2003).

123

Id. at 632.
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(i) revoking any physician class member’s DEA registration
merely because the doctor makes a recommendation for the use of
medical marijuana based on a sincere medical judgment and (ii)
from initiating any investigation solely on that ground. The
injunction should apply whether or not the doctor anticipates that
the patient will, in turn, use his or her recommendation to obtain
marijuana in violation of federal law.129
The federal government appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed largely on free speech and federalism
grounds.130 The federal government unsuccessfully sought U.S. Supreme Court
review.131 When a federal circuit court decides an issue of first impression, other
circuit courts tend to eventually decide the same issue. Often a circuit split
emerges. That is, one group of circuits decides the issue one way and another
group decides the issue another way. Once a circuit split matures, the U.S.
Supreme Court will often agree to review a suitable case to resolve the circuit
split. This did not happen with Conant. By denying certiorari review, the U.S.
Supreme Court let Conant stand, perhaps with the idea that the circuit courts
would address the issue and either form a consensus or create a circuit split.
However, no other federal intermediate appellate court has squarely addressed
the medical- cannabis-recommendation-as-free speech issue.132
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Id. at 634.
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See id. at 634-39.
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132
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Americans with Disabilities Act challenge to city ordinances banning medical marijuana
dispensaries); United States v. Osburn, 175 Fed. Appx. 789 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Conant
regarding public notice that cannabis is illegal under federal law); Willis v. Town of Marshall, NC,
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(5th Cir. 2005) (citing Conant regarding the importance of physician-patient communication);
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The Conant case is important to current cannabis policy for three reasons.
First, Conant addresses the distinction between “prescriptions” and
“recommendations.”133 A “prescription” is an order from a physician to a
pharmacist directing the pharmacist to dispense a controlled substance to a
patient. Without such a prescription, it is illegal for the pharmacist to dispense the
medication, and it is also illegal for the patient to possess the medication. As such,
a “prescription” is not a free speech activity. Rather, it is a proper subject of State
and federal regulation. Second, Conant stands for the proposition that a
physician’s medical cannabis recommendation to a patient is protected free speech
under the First Amendment. Although this concept has not been adopted by
subsequent caselaw, it appears to be the de facto rule regarding physicians who
endorse medical cannabis. Finally, because of Conant, States that have legalized
medicinal cannabis use the term “recommend” instead of “prescribe.”134
C. Federal Cannabis Criminal Enforcement Policy
i.

Ogden Memorandum

In March 2009, as part of the Obama Administration, Eric Holder was
installed as U.S. Attorney General. At this time, thirteen states had legalized
medical cannabis. On October 19, 2009, Deputy Attorney General David W.
Ogden issued the “Ogden Memo” to “provide[ ] clarification and guidance to
federal prosecutors in States that have enacted laws authorizing the medical use of
marijuana.”135 The Ogden Memo advised that it would be an inefficient use of
federal law enforcement resources to prosecute patients and caregivers lawfully
involved in State- sanctioned medical marijuana activities.136 However, the Ogden
Memo also stated that it would be an efficient use of federal law enforcement
resources where marijuana activities—medical or otherwise—implicated the
following areas:
[i]

unlawful possession or unlawful use of firearms;

[ii]

violence;

[iii]

sales to minors;

[iv]

133

financial and marketing activities inconsistent with the
terms, conditions, or purposes of state law, including
evidence of money laundering activity and/or financial
gains or excessive amounts of cash inconsistent with

See Conant, supra, at 635.

134

See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4731.30 (West 2020) (“Certificate to recommend medical use
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Odgen Memo at 1.

136

See id. at 1-2.
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purported compliance with state or local law;
[v]

amounts of marijuana inconsistent with purported
compliance with state or local law;

[vi]

illegal possession or sale of other controlled substances; or

[vii]

ties to other criminal enterprises.137
ii.

First Cole Memorandum

On June 29, 2011, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole issued the
First Cole Memo which reaffirmed the guidance contained in the Ogden Memo
and advised that large-scale cannabis growers would remain a federal law
enforcement priority even if such growers claimed to be cultivating medical
marijuana.138 At this time, seventeen jurisdictions had legalized medical
cannabis.
iii.
Second Cole Memorandum
On August 29, 2013, Cole issued the Second Cole Memo.139 At this
time, twenty-one jurisdictions had legalized medical cannabis. Moreover,
Colorado and Washington had legalized adult use cannabis while Alaska,
Oregon, and the District of Columbia were preparing to do likewise. The
Second Cole Memo updated the guidance of the first two memoranda “in light
of state ballot initiatives that legalize under state law the possession of small
amounts of marijuana and provide for the regulation of marijuana production,
processing, and sale.”140
The Second Cole Memo also updated the federal enforcement priorities
outlined in the Ogden Memo as follows:
[i]

Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;

[ii]

Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana
from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and
cartels;

[ii]

Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states
where it is legal under state law in some form to
other states;

137

Id. at 2.

138
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139
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140

Id.
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[iii]

Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity
from being used as a cover or pretext for the
trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal
activity;

[iv]

Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the
cultivation and distribution of marijuana;

[v]

Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation
of other adverse public health consequences
associated with marijuana use;

[vi]

Preventing growing marijuana on public lands
and the attendant public safety and environmental
dangers posed by marijuana production on public
lands; and

[vii]

Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal
property.141

The Second Cole Memo went on to advise that, so long as (i) the
cannabis-legalizing States maintained “strong and effective regulatory and
enforcement systems to control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession
of marijuana,”142 and (ii) the cannabis activity did not touch upon any of the
eight enforcement priorities, federal law enforcement officials would deem
cannabis enforcement an inefficient use of its resources and leave regulation
and criminal enforcement to State and local authorities.143 Holder served as
U.S. Attorney General until April 2015. Loretta Lynch succeeded Holder as
U.S. Attorney General for the remainder of the Obama Administration. Lynch’s
administration maintained the guidance outlined in the Ogden and Cole Memos.
In fact, Lynch was copied on the Second Cole Memo as the then-U.S. Attorney
for the Eastern District of New York and Chair of the Attorney General’s
Advisory Committee.144 This suggests that Lynch concurred with the Second
Cole Memo.
***
Collectively, these three memoranda set-forth a policy that, so long as
State medicinal cannabis activities did not involve any of the eight enforcement
priorities, federal prosecutors would not bring criminal charges against medical
cannabis participants. This amounted to passive permission for people to engage
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in medical cannabis activities with greatly reduced fear of federal criminal
liability. However, these memoranda merely indicated that the DOJ had chosen
not to prosecute certain medical cannabis activities, but it reserved the right to
do so. Moreover, these memoranda did not provide a legal defense. If a federal
prosecutor decided to charge someone with a marijuana crime, these
memoranda provided no legal cover. Finally, these memoranda were always
subject to modification or rescission by subsequent Attorneys General. So, the
memoranda’s policies and guidance lacked the permanence, stability, and
predictability of a statute. Nevertheless, the Ogden Memo, First Cole Memo,
and Second Cole Memo created a legal environment which allowed the
fledgling cannabis industry to grow into a multi-billion-dollar sector.
iv.

Sessions Memorandum

In February 2017, Jeff Sessions became U.S. Attorney General.
Sessions is a staunch opponent of cannabis use. Thus, pro-cannabis reform
advocates and the cannabis industry were quite concerned about what cannabis
law enforcement policies Sessions would implement. For example, the
governors of Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington co-authored a letter to
Sessions urging him to continue the policy guidance outlined in the Second
Cole Memo.145 Sessions rebuffed the governors’ concerns.146
On January 4, 2018, Sessions formally rescinded the Ogden, First Cole,
and Second Cole Memos:
In the Controlled Substances Act, Congress has generally
prohibited the cultivation, distribution, and possession of
marijuana. 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. It has established significant
penalties for these crimes. 21 U.S.C. § 841 et seq. These
activities also may serve as the basis for the prosecution of other
crimes, such as those prohibited by the money laundering
statutes, the unlicensed money transmitter statute, and the Bank
Secrecy Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57, 1960; 31U.S.C. §5318.
These statutes reflect Congress’s determination that marijuana is
a dangerous drug and that marijuana activity is a serious crime.
In deciding which marijuana activities to prosecute under these
laws with the Department’s finite resources, prosecutors should
follow the well-established principles that govern all federal
prosecutions. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti originally set
forth these principles in 1980, and they have been refined over
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time, as reflected in chapter 9-27.000 of the U.S. Attorneys’
Manual. These principles require federal prosecutors deciding
which cases to prosecute to weigh all relevant considerations,
including federal law enforcement priorities set by the Attorney
General, the seriousness of the crime, the deterrent effect of
criminal prosecution, and the cumulative impact of particular
crimes on the community.
Given the Department’s well-established general principles,
previous nationwide guidance specific to marijuana
enforcement is unnecessary and is rescinded, effective
immediately. This memorandum is intended solely as a guide to
the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion in
accordance with all applicable laws, regulations, and
appropriations. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.147
v.

Sessions Memorandum Aftermath

Initially, the Sessions Memo caused a great deal of concern within the
cannabis industry. Many feared a harsh, alcohol prohibition-style federal law
enforcement crackdown against cannabis industry participants. These fears
have not materialized for four primary reasons.
First, the revocation of the Ogden and Cole Memos made the various
U.S. Attorneys much more important to federal cannabis law enforcement
policy. From the Ogden Memo to the Sessions Memo (2009-2018), the entire
U.S. Department of Justice, which includes all of the U.S. Attorney Offices, was
advised against prosecuting the cannabis industry so long as the cannabis
activities did not implicate any of the enforcement priorities. The Sessions
Memo abolished this guidance and instructed U.S. Attorneys to treat cannabis
industry activities the same as any other potential criminal conduct. Thus, it
was left to the individual U.S. Attorney Offices to decide whether or not to
prosecute cannabis industry participants.
Presently, virtually none of the U.S. Attorney Offices have used the
broader, post-Sessions Memo latitude to vigorously prosecute the cannabis
industry. For example, on the day the Sessions Memo was published, the U.S.
Attorney for the District of Colorado issued a statement:
Today the Attorney General rescinded the Cole Memo on
marijuana prosecutions, and directed that federal marijuana
prosecution decisions be governed by the same principles that
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have long governed all of our prosecution decisions. The United
States Attorney’s Office in Colorado has already been guided by
these principles in marijuana prosecutions—focusing in
particular on identifying and prosecuting those who create the
greatest safety threats to our communities around the state. We
will, consistent with the Attorney General’s latest guidance,
continue to take this approach in all of our work with our law
enforcement partners throughout Colorado.148
The cannabis industry interpreted this statement to mean that, at least in the
District of Colorado, the post-Sessions Memo environment would be little
different than the Ogden and Cole Memo period. This statement was also
important because Colorado has a relatively mature cannabis industry market
and, therefore, serves as a leader and exemplar to the other U.S. cannabis
industry markets. Moreover, since the Sessions Memo, it appears that the
various U.S. Attorney Offices are continuing to follow the Ogden and Cole
Memos. Although the Ogden and Cole Memos are no longer the federal
cannabis enforcement policy de jure, they remain the de facto policy. Finally,
U.S. Attorneys are, at least indirectly, subject to the political will of the citizens
of their respective districts. If, for example, a U.S. Attorney vigorously
prosecuted the cannabis industry in a State where cannabis is popular, there
would likely be political repercussions. And, if such a U.S. Attorney were to
later seek elective office, his history of unpopular cannabis prosecutions would
likely be a significant political liability. In sum, the post-Sessions Memo DOJ
has not significantly affected the cannabis industry.
Second, Congress has withheld DOJ and FBI funding for investigations
and prosecutions of the medical cannabis industry since 2014. This legislation
is associated primarily with Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) who cosponsored defunding language in various appropriations bills since the early2000s. A recent reiteration of this defunding legislation was passed as part of
the federal appropriations act for the 2019 fiscal year:
None of the funds made available under this Act to the
Department of Justice may be used, with respect to any of the
States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
148
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Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming, or with respect to the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, Guam, or Puerto Rico, to prevent any of them from
implementing their own laws that authorize the use, distribution,
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.149
Thus, even if the DOJ wanted to vigorously investigate and prosecute medical
cannabis operators, it lacks the funds to do so.
Third, since the Sessions Memo, States have continued to establish and
operate medical and recreational cannabis programs. Specifically, since 2018,
Missouri, Oklahoma, and Utah have legalized medical cannabis, and Illinois,
Michigan, and Vermont have legalized adult use cannabis. These States continue
to permit cannabis industry activity within their borders without apparent
concern for federal criminal law enforcement.
Finally, over the last decade the cannabis industry has achieved inertia
that defies criminal law enforcement resistance. The cannabis industry has
ceased to be an outlaw community of low capital outsiders and has become a
multi-billion dollar, mainstream enterprise. Politically powerful individuals and
corporations are now involved in the cannabis industry. The cannabis industry
directly and indirectly employs thousands of people. In the current
environment, a large- scale law enforcement crackdown on the cannabis
industry would be intolerably economically disruptive and impolitic.
vi.

Attorney General Barr

With the resignation of Attorney General Sessions, President Trump
nominated William Barr to be U.S. Attorney General in 2018.150 The following
colloquy occurred during Barr’s Senate confirmation hearing:
Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ):
Mr. Barr:

“Do you believe it was the right decision to
rescind [the Cole Memo]?”
“My approach to this would be not
to upset settled expectations and
the reliance interest that have arisen
as a result of the Cole Memoranda
and investments that have been
made . . . . However, I think the
current situation is untenable
I’m not going to
go after companies that have relied
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on the Cole Memoranda.
However, we either should have a
federal law that prohibits
marijuana everywhere, which I
would support myself. Because I
think it’s a mistake to back off on
marijuana. However, if
we want states to have their own
laws . . . let’s get there the right
way.”151
Here, Barr summarized the current federal legal dilemma concerning
cannabis. First, by acknowledging the “settled expectations,” Barr recognizes
the existence of a large and wealthy American cannabis industry that has
emerged over the last decade. Second, Barr acknowledges the untenable
situation of the current state of U.S. cannabis law: How can there be legal
medical and recreational cannabis at the State level when cannabis is illegal
federally? Third, Barr admits to his anti-cannabis personal policy preferences.
Unlike individuals like Anslinger and Nixon, however, Barr seems unwilling to
allow his personal views to drive his administration’s public policies. This is
progress. Finally, Barr implicitly asks Congress to resolve the dilemma
legislatively. In any event, Barr’s DOJ has so far maintained the status quo with
respect to federal cannabis law enforcement.
XII.

CONCLUSION

Were cannabis a newly discovered plant, it would be heralded as a
miracle drug and the pharmaceutical industry would enthusiastically study it to
unlock its therapeutic secrets. This is not the case. Cannabis has a long history.
With respect to American public policy, the history of cannabis is shaped by
racism, nativism, mendacity, unintended consequences, and a host of other
imperfect human motives. Current federal cannabis policy is not a product of
logic, reason, facts, evidence, or science. It is a product of history. History is
not necessarily a linear march toward progress. Civilizations rise and fall.
Enlightenment can give way to barbarism. Therefore, it is possible that
American society could eventually return to cannabis prohibition. At present,
this outcome seems highly unlikely. Instead, in late 2020, comprehensive
federal reform of cannabis laws appears to be a matter of “when,” not “if.” It
remains to be seen what form such federal reforms will take.
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